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DEFAMED BUT RETAINED PUBLIC EMPLOYEES:
ADDRESSING A GAP IN DUE PROCESS
JURISPRUDENCE
Nat Stern*
The Constitution restrains the discretion of public employers in a
variety of ways. A public employee may not be dismissed for speech on
a matter of public concern unless the comment demonstrably subverts
the mission of the employee's office.' Likewise, a public employee who
may be terminated only for cause must be afforded an adequate
opportunity to respond to allegations of unfitness before being
dismissed.2 Moreover, even an employee not entitled to tenure may,
under certain circumstances, have recourse if the announced grounds for
dismissal defame the employee and inflict a tangible injury on her.3
In each of these instances, however, the event warranting
constitutional relief is loss of a public position. In particular, stigma
imposed in the course of discipline falling short of termination-for
example, suspension or reprimand-is generally thought not to trigger
procedural due process. 4 Thus, whether a defamatory assessment of a
public employee impinges on a liberty interest may rest on whether the
statement formally occurred as part of a dismissal or other type of
action.
This Article questions the wisdom of drawing a stark dichotomy
between termination and other proceedings in which employees may be
subject to false and damaging evaluations. After reviewing the origins of
the controversial "stigma-plus" doctrine and its elaboration by the

* John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.
Research for this Article was supported by a grant from Florida State University. Julie Landrigan
provided valuable research assistance.
1. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
144-46 (1983).
2. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541-43 (1985).
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See infra notes 12-27 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court, this Article examines the doctrine's treatment by lower
courts in the context of public employment. This Article then argues for
at least a minimal degree of procedural protection for maligned public
employees who have retained their employment. Finally, conceding the
unlikely prospect that this approach will be incorporated into federal due
process doctrine, this Article proposes a model that could be adopted
through construction of state constitutions.
1. THE RISE AND PERSISTENCE OF "STIGMA-PLUS"
A.

From Roth to Siegert: The Exclusion of Reputation as a Liberty
Interest

Modern procedural due process doctrine governing public
employment effectively begins with the Supreme Court's decision in
Board of Regents v. Roth.5 The Court held that Roth, who challenged the
termination of his stint as an assistant professor, was not entitled to a
hearing because he had not been deprived of a property6 or liberty
interest. The Court did, however, indicate that an employee's liberty
could be implicated where the state linked his discharge with an
accusation that "might seriously damage his standing and associations in
[the] community. '7 In a similar vein, the opinion suggested that a
deprivation of liberty would take place where the manner of termination
"imposed on [the discharged employee] a stigma or other disability that
foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities. '8 These statements, along with the Court's approving
citation to the proposition set forth in Wisconsin v. Constantineau9 that
"'[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an

5. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
6. The Court stated that property interests "are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent li.e., from the Constitution] source such as state law." id. at 577.
Since Roth's contract had not provided for renewal at the end of its term, he did not have an
expectation of continued employment sufficient to create a property interest. See id. at 578. A
contemporaneous decision, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), furnished an example of
anticipation of renewed employment rising to the level of a property interest. There, the university
instructor dismissed without a hearing plausibly alleged that the university had a de facto tenure
system assuring those in his position of continued employment if their work was satisfactory. See id.
at 600-03.
7. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
8. Id.
9. 400U.S.433(1971).
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opportunity to be heard are essential,"'" could reasonably be read as
recognizing reputation as a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause."
Three years later, however, the Court repudiated the notion that
damage to reputation per se implicates due process safeguards. In Paul
v. Davis,'2 the plaintiff alleged that police officials had falsely designated
him as an "active shoplifter" in a flyer distributed to local merchants.
The Court rejected Davis's claim that the damage done to his reputation
entitled him to relief under section 1983. 3 Assuming that impairment of4
employment opportunities and other harms could result from the flyer,'
the Court found that these consequences would not retroactively
transform the false portrayal into a deprivation of liberty. Rather, the
crucial consideration was that the original injury was to Davis's
"reputation alone," unaccompanied by damage to "more tangible
interests."'- In the Court's eyes, its precedents had never endorsed the
principle that "mere defamation" amounted to deprivation of liberty; 6
where due process had come into play, the state's action had
simultaneously diminished a "right
or status" that the victim had
7
law.
state
under
enjoyed
previously
Paul provoked an avalanche of criticism. Many have accused the
opinion's author, then Justice Rehnquist, of having deliberately distorted
precedent to exclude reputation from the roster of liberty interests."' A
10. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 (quoting Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437).
11. For discussion of the scope of liberty interests in other contexts, particularly physical
confinement, see, for example, Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process
Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482 (1984); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996).
12. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001) (creating liability for deprivation of federal rights "under
color of" state law).
14. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 697.
15. Id. at 701.
16. Id. at 706.
17. /d. at 711.
18. See, e.g., George C. Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid
Conflicting Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REV. 43, 61 (1977); Melvyn R. Durchslag, Federalism and
Constitutional Liberties: Varying the Remedy to Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 723, 738-39
(1979) (arguing that Paul "reduced stare decisis to twelve meaningless letters"); Cynthia R. Farina,
Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 192-93 (1991); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 424 (1977); Pierce, supra note 11, at 1983-84
(describing Paul's characterization of the Constantineau opinion as "purely historical invention");
Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1075 n.167
(1984) (referring to Paul's "satire of stare decisis"); David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A
Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 355 (1976) (concluding after analysis that the Paul
opinion suffers from "near total failure ... to deal candidly with contrary decisions"); Mark
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number of commentators have perceived the decision as having been
largely animated by the aim of curbing access to federal courts under
section 1983.'" Some have detected inconsistency between Paul's refusal
to accord enhanced status to the reputational interest under due process
and the Court's limitations on First Amendment protection for
individuals against defamation suits.2 ° More broadly, it has been argued
that Paul's denial of an opportunity to participate in governmental
decisions that may damage one's good name contradicts the value of
individual dignity inherent in due process. 2
Whatever the strength of these criticisms, however, Paul's holding
has persisted, and in particular its narrow construction of Roth has
colored consideration of subsequent due process claims by allegedly
defamed public employees. While preserving the principle that
defamatory grounds for dismissal can violate due process, the Court has
insisted that a number of conditions be met. In Bishop v. Wood,23 the
Court held that the allegedly false reasons given for an employee's
discharge could not infringe a liberty interest unless those reasons were
publicly disclosed.24 Further, Codd v. Velger25 required that those reasons
Tushnet, The Constitutional Right to One's Good Name: An Examination of the Scholarship of Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, 64 Ky. L.J. 753, 753 (1976); Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some
Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1,43-55 (1982).
19. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v. Davis,
85 VA. L. REV. 569, 570-71 (1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process,
JudicialReview, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 309, 340 (1993); Robert Jerome
Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property. FederalCommon Low and Section 1983, 51 S. CAL.
L. REV. 355, 393-97 (1978); Randolph J. Haines, Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The
Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV. 191, 191 (1978).
20. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 723 n.l I (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)); James M. Greenfield,
Note, Paul v. Davis: Reputation Succumbs to Judicial Self-Restraint, 38 U. PITT. L. REV. 417, 423
(1976); Heyward C. Hosch 111,Note, The Interest in Limiting the Disclosure of Personal
Information: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 36 VAND. L. REV. 139, 161-66 (1983).
21. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 725-26 (2d ed. 1988);
Monaghan, supra note 18, at 426-27; Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a
More Responsive Approach to ProceduralProtection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. I 11, 145-47 (1979). For
the argument that reputation should be protected as a property interest, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr., Fundamental PropertyRights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 590-98 (1997).
22. For the defense of Paul's result that procedural due process does not require a prior
hearing where state tort law permits a subsequent defamation action, see Krotoszynski, supra note
21, at 601-02; Rodney A. Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort
Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 831,
846-47 (1982).
23. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
24. See id. at 348. For a useful discussion of the question of what constitutes public disclosure
under Bishop, see Jenny S. Brannan, Comment, The Publication Debate in Deprivation of
OccupationalLiberty Claims, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 171, 181-82 (1998).
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be false; 26 a pejorative assessment that does not imply specific untrue
accusations, or dubious but accurate grounds for dismissal, presumably
do not qualify.27
Finally, the Court appears to have effectively confined public
employees' suits for defamation by the state to instances of termination.
Paul found the language of Roth "inconsistent with any notion that a
defamation perpetrated by a government official but unconnected with
any refusal to rehire would be actionable under the Fourteenth
Amendment."2 Bishop's requirement of public disclosure referred only
to instances in which the complaining employee had been discharged.29
Likewise, the Codd Court explained that a claim of stigmatization must
arise from "some factual dispute between an employer and a discharged
employee which has some significant bearing on the employee's
reputation."30 Perhaps most tellingly, the Court in Siegert v. Gilley3
dismissed a suit by a former government employee against his former
supervisor who wrote to a prospective new employer that he could not
recommend the plaintiff because he was inept, unethical, and
untrustworthy. 32 While the plaintiff, Siegert, alleged that Gilley's letter
had caused Siegert's rejection for the new position, the Court in a terse
discussion found crucial that Gilley's alleged defamation "was not33
uttered incident to the termination of Siegert's [prior] employment.
Rather, Siegert had already resigned from his earlier position when the
letter was written. In thus emphasizing the uncoupling of Siegert's
departure from his job and the subsequent alleged libel, the Court
overrode the dissent's objection that it had misread Paul in "suggest[ing]
that reputational injury deprives a person of liberty only when
combined
34
employment.
future
not
employment,
present
of
loss
with

25. 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (per curiam).
26. See id. at 628.
27. In this respect the Court's due process jurisprudence appears substantially aligned with its
First Amendment doctrine governing defamation suits against private individuals. See generally
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), discussed at notes 54-55 infra and
accompanying text; Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986) (making
liability of media defendant for statement on matter of public concern dependent on proof of
statement's falsity).
28. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976).
29. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1970).
30. Codd, 429 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added).
31. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
32. See id. at 228.
33. Id. at 234.
34. Id. at 241 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The Understandingof "Stigma-Plus" in the Lower Courts

The principle that the state must harm more than one's reputation
alone to violate the liberty shielded by due process is now well-settled,
leaving only questions of its application to be resolved. For example,
while commentators tend to regard sex offender notification statutes
("SORAs") as implicating due process,35 courts have been more divided
on the issue.36 Similarly, federal courts of appeals have split on whether
stigmatizing material in an employee's personnel file must actually be
disseminated to meet Bishop's requirement of publication." Differences
over the due process ramifications of other government action affecting
one's standing in the community may loom as well.:
On the question of whether disciplinary action short of termination
can qualify as "stigma-plus," however, courts seem to have received a
clear signal from the high court. Even courts of appeals that adopt a
more expansive view of what constitutes publication of defamatory
statements apparently assume the requisite of the employee's dismissal."
35. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law: Liberty Interests in the Preventive State:
Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1167 (1999); Jane A. Small, Note, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood? Due
Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1451 (1999).
Some have regarded sex offender notification statutes ("SORAs") as a threat to an offender's liberty
interest as a matter of substantive due process. See Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, Comment, The Child
Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended Results
Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 788 (1996); Caroline
Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and Substantive Due
Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 89 (1996).
36. For a canvass of decisions, see Logan, supra note 35, at 1187-97. See also Doe v. Dep't of
Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 59 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S.Ct. 1959 (U.S. 2002)
(finding liberty interest affected).
37. Compare, e.g., Hughes v. City of Garland, 204 F.3d 223, 228 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
due process claim where stigmatizing material in employee's file had not been disclosed), and
McCullough v. Wyandanch Union Free Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 272, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1999) (same),
with Buxton v. City of Plant City, 871 F.2d 1037, 1045-46 (1 lthCir. 1989) (holding that the
presence of false statement in file of dismissed employee implicates due process). For a summary of
the division among courts of appeals as of a few years ago, see Brannan, supra note 24, at 183-87.
38. Examples include denial of a high school diploma for failure to pass a competency test,
see generally James P. Durling, Note, Testing the Tests: The Due Process Implications of Minimum
Competency Testing, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 577 (1984); disclosure of confidential information, see
Bruce W. Clark, Note, The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 133,
139-44 (1982); and, more generally, the imposition of "shame sanctions," see James Q. Whitman,
What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1988).
39. See, e.g., Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 633 (2d Cir.
1996) (stating that procedural due process is implicated "[wihen the state makes stigmatizing
allegations in the course of dismissing an employee"); Ledford v. Delancey, 612 F.2d 883, 887 (4th
Cir. 1980) (recognizing plaintiff employee's right "that his personnel file contain no substantially
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While an unequivocal demotion may occasionally be treated as
tantamount to termination, and thus warrant due process review,n° less
severe disciplinary action is excluded. As the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals recently declared, "a 'discharge or more' is required in order to
satisfy the 'plus' element of the stigma-plus test. A transfer or a missed
promotion is not enough."4 In accordance with this approach, employees
allegedly stigmatized in the course of a reassignment are routinely
rebuffed when bringing due process claims.42 Even suspensions are
generally considered insufficiently prejudicial to require a hearing. 3

II. THE INCONGRUITY OF DENYING DUE PROCESS IN
NONTERMINATION ACTIONS
A.

The Unjustified Wall Between Terminationand Other Discipline

The wholesale distinction between dismissal and other disciplinary
actions in employers' disparagement of employees appears to be rooted
more in intuition than in logic. Obviously, loss of one's employment
with a public agency altogether constitutes a more drastic injury than a
diminution of the value of that employment through demotion,
suspension, transfer, or reprimand. On the other hand, this is often a
matter of degree rather than kind. At least in the case of relegation to a
lesser rank, the change in status deemed crucial to activating due process

false information with respect to his work performance or the reasons for his discharge when that
information is available to prospective employers") (emphasis added). In Schneeweis v. Jacobs, No.
91-2665, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15623, at *5-8 (4th Cir. July 7, 1992), the court did consider the
liberty interest claim of a suspended basketball coach. The court rejected the claim, however, on the
grounds that no derogatory information had been placed in the coach's personnel file. See id. at *89. Moreover, the court may have regarded suspension under the circumstances as tantamount to
dismissal. See id. at *5-8.
40. See Kamenesh v. City of Miami, 772 F. Supp. 583, 591 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Smith v.
Comm'r, 554 N.E.2d 1215, 1219-20 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990), superceded by, 567 N.E.2d 924 (Mass.
1991).
41. Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001).
42. See, e.g., Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1486 (11th Cir. 1992);
Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1417 (8th Cir. 1983); Thomas v. Smith, 897 F.2d 154, 156 (5th
Cir. 1989); Blevins v. Plummer, 613 F.2d 767, 768 (9th Cir. 1980); Moore v. Otero, 557 F.2d 435,
438 (5th Cir. 1977).
43. See, e.g., Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 164 (5th Cir. 2000) (police officer
suspended without pay); Thomas v. Harvard, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (police
officer accused of engaging in criminal activity); Simonson v. Iowa State Univ., 603 N.W.2d 557,
561-62 (Iowa 1999) (professor placed on paid administrative leave pending investigation of sexual
harassment complaints against him); Mississippi State Dep't of Health v. Hogue, 801 So. 2d 794,
797 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (department of health employee suspended without pay for fifteen days).
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is present." Demotion, or even transfer to a technically comparable but
manifestly less desirable position, will doubtless be viewed by many as a
harm at least as grievous as the denial of access to liquor that the Paul
Court found crucial to Constantineau'soutcome.45
Indeed, termination as a requisite to due process consideration
assumes a bright line between dismissal and other discipline that may be
blurred in reality. At a minimum, assignment to a lower position
represents termination of one's present position in a basic, if not the
most extreme, sense. A transfer in many instances can plausibly be
viewed as effectively ending one's current job. Even a suspension,
depending on its nature and length, can significantly diminish one's
professional status. While the gap between termination and other actions
will often or even usually be pronounced, current doctrine errs in
assuming that it invariably will be.
It is worth underlining that the nontermination discipline at issue in
this context does not take place in the abstract. Rather, the discipline is
accompanied by-and presumably the result of-the employer's harsh,
and allegedly false, appraisal of the employee's performance. The action
amplifies the force of the criticism that prompted it. Thus, the synergy
between defamation and altered employment status that qualifies as
stigma-plus in the termination setting operates here as well, if less
dramatically.
Moreover, the same concerns for participation, accuracy, and
dignity that presumably underlie recognition of due process in the case
of termination-cum-smear do not categorically disappear when the
employer's axe falls short of entirely severing the employee's
association with the agency. A suspended employee, for example, may
well be relieved that she has been allowed to retain a position with the
agency. However, she is still likely to feel keenly the absence of any
process before she was openly branded-assuming that Bishop's
publication requirement has been met-as incompetent, insubordinate,
or otherwise defective.
The stark dichotomy between dismissal and other employer action
where due process is at stake stands in contrast to employment law,
where statutory proscriptions extend to nontermination conduct that
impinges on the statute's underlying values. For example, bans on
gender discrimination in employment encompass far more than outright
dismissal based on sex.46 Indeed, a broad range of discriminatory
44. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976).
45. See id. at 708-09.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
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behavior that falls short of firing an employee may qualify as prohibited
harassment.47

The formal separation of dismissal from other employer decisions
also departs philosophically, if not technically, from First Amendment
doctrine in other areas. Perhaps most notably, the Court has refused to
confine the bar on dispensing patronage according to political affiliation
to instances of the discharge of public employees for belonging to a
particular party. 4s Rather, in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,49 the
Court held that a variety of personnel decisions involving low-level
employees-promotions, transfers, recalls, and hiring-could not be
based on party affiliation. 0 The Court determined that the same
rationales undergirding the First Amendment's general prohibition of
patronage firing applied to these practices as well. While the penalties
for exercising the right of association in these instances fall short of the
ultimate price of immediate dismissal, the Court recognized that they are
hardly trivial: "Employees who do not compromise their beliefs stand to
lose the considerable increases in pay and job satisfaction attendant to
promotions, the hours and maintenance expenses that are consumed by
long daily commutes, and even their jobs if they are not rehired after a
'temporary' layoff."5 Likewise, the government's asserted interests in
applying partisan criteria, such as efficiency and fostering party-based
democracy, were deemed no more promoted in these contexts than in the
case of dismissal 2 Similarly, it should be recognized that the values

an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's ... sex.") (emphasis added); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (permitting plaintiff to establish violation by "proving that
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment").
47. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (stating that "the very fact that the
discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to
employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title Vii's broad rule of
workplace equality"); Christopher M. Courts, An Adverse Employment Action-Not Just an
Unfriendly Place to Work: Co-Worker Retaliatory Harassment Under Title VII, 87 IOWA L. REV.
235, 243-45 (2002).
48. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1980),
established that public employees can't be dismissed because of their refusal to support the political
party of their superior, unless party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position
involved.
49. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
50. See id. at 65, 75.
51. Id. at 74.
52. See id.; see also O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 712 (1996)
(invalidating city's removal of independent contractor in alleged retaliation for contractor's support
of mayor's opponent in election campaign).
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embodied by due process are implicated, if with lesser force,53 by
allegedly defamatory evaluations made in the course of personnel
decisions other than dismissal.
It is also instructive that in defamation doctrine itself, the Court has
eschewed bright-line distinctions that would automatically place an
entire category of statements beyond the reach of plaintiffs. In Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 4 the Court rejected the proposition that
expression denominated as "opinion" should be fully privileged in every
instance. Rather, the Court found more logical a case-by-case
determination of whether the statement in question conveyed to a
reasonable audience a provably false assertion.55 Again, a similarly
individualized assessment of whether a putatively false reason for a
particular personnel decision rises to the level of "stigma-plus" seems
more appropriate than a blanket assumption that nontermination actions
must inevitably fall below it. Indeed, the Court has refused to adopt a
crabbed notion of the injury that can result from defamatory expression;
on the contrary, the Court has embraced a sweeping conception of the
harms that can warrant an award of actual damages. 6
B. Impact of Defamation on NonterminatedEmployees
In some ways, current doctrine leaves a defamed but retained public
employee in a worse legal position than if she had been simply
discharged. If the alleged defamation takes place as part of a dismissal,
then the employee has recourse to remedies for violation of due process.
However, if the government treats the employee as deserving censure
but not release, then this adverse evaluation may shadow the employee
throughout her service with the agency, and perhaps beyond. If the
employee later voluntarily leaves the agency, or she is terminated on
grounds unrelated to the earlier disparagement, then the libelous
assessment may haunt her pursuit of future positions without her having
had the opportunity to respond.

53. See infra Part Ill for suggestions as to how to accommodate the lesser impact of personnel
decisions short of dismissal.
54. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
55. See id. at 21. The Court confined its holding to statements on matters of public concern,
see id.at 19-20, and reserved the question of whether it applied to cases involving nonmedia
defendants. See id. at 20 n.6.
56. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (holding that actual harm
inflicted by defamatory falsehood includes "impairment of reputation and standing in the
community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss3/5

10

Stern: Defamed but Retained Public Employees: Addressing a Gap in Due Pr

2003]

DEFAMED BUT RETAINED PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

In a sense, this line of argument extends the logic of those courts of
appeals that have adopted a more expansive interpretation of Bishop's
publication requirement. 7 Courts finding the likelihood of disclosure of
stigmatizing information in a discharged public employee's personnel
file to meet the publication requirement have recognized the potential of
this damaging material to interfere with prospects for other employment.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has considered publication to have
occurred
"where the stigmatizing charges are placed in the discharged
employee's personnel file and are likely to be disclosed to prospective
employers." We have recognized, in fact, that this is the very action
that circulates the stigmatization. Potential future employers
undoubtedly will consult plaintiff's prior employer when she applies
for supervisory positions.58

The court had earlier explained that compelling an employee under these
circumstances to wait until the derogatory comments had actually
deprived her of future employment would place her in an untenable
position. As one court vividly put it, the combination of the accusation's
appearance in the file and the likelihood of its disclosure trapped the
employee "between the devil and the deep blue sea."59
Where the disparaging information is placed in the file in
connection with discipline that leaves the employee within the agency,
the likelihood that the information will be disclosed to a potential future
employer is admittedly less than when the disparagement is
accompanied by dismissal. Realistically, however, the possibility of
disclosure is far from negligible. Public employees, after all, often do
move on to other positions, and it seems reasonable to assume that a
disciplined employee is more likely than others to eventually leave. If
she is not provided a contemporaneous opportunity to question her
employer's allegedly false statement, then the charge may haunt her later
application for new employment. In that case, the prejudice to her job
prospects will be substantial, if not as severe as if the charge had
occasioned her dismissal.

57. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
58. Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quoting Brandt v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 820 F.2d 41,45 (2d Cir. 1987)) (citations omitted).
59. Brandt, 820 F.2d at 45 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted); accord Ledford v.
Delancey, 612 F,2d 883, 886 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that dismissed employee had "a protected right
with respect to the contents of his personnel file when that file may be the subject of inspection by
prospective employers").
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Moreover, someone whose pursuit of different employment is
plagued by an old unanswered charge may encounter formidable
evidentiary obstacles in attempting to satisfy potential employers of the
charge's falsity. First, of course, is the sheer staleness of evidence to
rebut accusations that may be years old. The law has long sought to
guard against the erosion of a party's ability to prove her case because of
faded memories and the unavailability of other supportive material. 6
Many job applicants hobbled by damning charges in their file may have
great difficulty locating, much less enlisting, witnesses who can offer
refuting testimonials. Ironically, some public employees may be better
off in the long run if their employer's disgruntlement provokes their
dismissal rather than less draconian measures. Whatever the circuits'
various understandings of publication, current doctrine undoubtedly
does provide due process for the terminated, allegedly defamed
employee where publication has occurred. Thus, an opportunity exists
for an airing of the charges at a time when potentially corroborative
witnesses and other evidence are relatively readily accessible.
The argument for not categorically distinguishing between
termination and other discipline is especially strong insofar as some
courts may not require that the allegedly false contents of a personnel
file pertain to an employee's dismissal in order for the discharge to
trigger due process review of the file.' In that case, the employee's right
to address a particular charge would hinge on the fortuity of whether the
charge had been leveled in the context of dismissal or other action. Thus,
an employee might be assigned to another position for allegedly having
defied an agency rule, chafe under the less rewarding conditions, and
ultimately resign in discouragement; the employee would not have had a
liberty interest in challenging the memorialization of her supposedly
obstreperous behavior. However, if that employee remained with the
60. This is a major purpose of statutes of limitations. See Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Brobeck,
Phleger & Harrison, 958 P.2d 1062, 1074 (Cal. 1998); Totura & Co. v. Williams, 754 So. 2d 671,
681 (Fla. 2000), appeal dismissed sub nom., Williams v. Garden City Claims, Inc., 783 So. 2d 267
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Blanco v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 689 N.E.2d 506, 513 (N.Y. 1997).
61. In Ledford v. Delancey, 612 F.2d 883, 887 (4th Cir. 1980), the court stated broadly that
the discharged employee had "a right that his personnel file contain no substantially false
information with respect to his work performance or the reasons for his discharge when that
information is available to prospective employers." While the facts of Ledford apparently did not
require the court to distinguish between the grounds for dismissal and other allegedly false material
in the employee's file, see id. at 885, there is good reason to read the court's use of the disjunctive
literally. Otherwise, employers inclined to place dubious charges in an employee's file might be
given perverse incentive to avoid linking the charges to the employee's intended dismissal, even if
they in fact substantially prompted the dismissal. Rather, an employer might reach to devise other
grounds, not involving potentially defamatory allegations, for releasing the employee.
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agency and was later fired, then her liberty interest would be
acknowledged if the charge continued to taint her personnel file. Even
courts adopting a stricter publication standard would find a liberty
interest implicated once the charge was actually disclosed to a
prospective employer.62 While a terminated employee saddled with this
denigrating material in her file will presumably be more inhibited in her
job search than one who has voluntarily left, this difference should not
be constitutionally dispositive. A potential employer who regards certain
employee conduct as intolerable will consider an applicant's
commission of that conduct as grounds for rejection whether it provoked
the applicant's dismissal or less severe discipline.
The value of constitutional protection against unjustified
stigmatization of public employees is heightened by the precarious
position of at-will employees, who are especially in need of recognition
of a liberty interest in their good name. For employees who enjoy greater
job security, procedural protection against unfair discipline will typically
already exist. 63 An at-will employee, on the other hand, will be more
vulnerable to arbitrary employer behavior even if she is not dismissed. In
addition, while at-will employees are not universally less marketable
than their more entrenched counterparts, they are significantly more
likely to be so. Accordingly, they will generally be more hampered by a
tainted personnel file.
C. The FloodgatesProblem
Perhaps the strongest objection to recognizing that nontermination
discipline can sometimes be the vehicle for "stigma-plus" is the danger
of excessive constitutionalization of routine personnel decisions. The
Court itself in a related context has admonished against the judiciary's64
becoming a monitor of public officials' management discretion.
Forcing additional procedural requirements on public employers could
seriously hamstring their ability to run their office efficiently and hence
to fulfill the agency's mission.
One response to this concern is that the circumstance of a
stigmatized employee is different from the situation in Paul that
62. See, e.g., Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir. 1997); Ortega-Rosario v.
Alvarado-Ortiz, 917 F.2d 71, 72-74 (1st Cir. 1990); Copeland v. Phila. Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139,
1148 (3d Cir. 1988).
63. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (2000).
64. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (stating that "[w]hen employee
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern
to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices").
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prompted the Court to express its opposition to making the Fourteenth
Amendment "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may already be administered by the States. 65 On the contrary,
an employee who seeks to invoke tort law against an employer for citing
allegedly false grounds for disciplining the employee will probably
confront a formidable set of privileges. 6 Courts' willingness to find a
liberty interest when those grounds pertain to dismissal probably reflects
in part tacit recognition of this obstacle. Besides, the fundamental
interest of the besmirched employee is not-or should not be-the
recovery of damages, but rather the restoration of employability that a
fair hearing could provide.
In any event, erasing the sharp boundary between termination and
other employer action need not entail an explosion of procedural
obligations. Rather, a more modest and nuanced approach can tailor the
process provided to both the impact on the employee and the practical
requirements of management. The following section suggests how such
an approach might operate.
III.

A PROPOSED MODEL FOR A LIMITED CHANCE AT VINDICATION

The Court has long recognized that "[t]he very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation., 67 In particular, the extent to
which a disciplined employee who has allegedly been defamed could be
determined by individualized consideration
of the factors spelled out by
6s
Eldridge:
v.
Mathews
in
the Court
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail. 69

65. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
66. See generally Alex B. Long, Note, Addressing the Cloud Over Employee References: A
Survey of Recently Enacted State Legislation, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177 (1997).
67. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
68. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
69. Id. at 335.
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Under this approach, due process could be satisfied in most instances by
only the modest degree of procedure needed to avoid fundamental
unfairness.
A.

The Presumptionof Informality

The type of procedural protection, to which an employee facing
discipline on potentially defamatory grounds should be entitled, will
reflect the strong presumption of flexibility and informality that has
governed the Court's due process jurisprudence over the last three
decades. 7° Encumbering the state's managerial discretion with an
elaborate set of procedures is neither necessary nor desirable. Rather,
public employees should be provided a minimal opportunity to guard
against the impairment of their career by a record of disciplinary action
founded on a significantly inaccurate charge.
The Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez7 illustrates that disciplinary
imperatives need not preclude all consideration of due process. Goss
held that public school officials could not summarily suspend students
from school on charges of misconduct. Students' interest in "avoid[ing]
unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process, with all of its
unfortunate consequences, 72 compelled officials to offer an accused
student a meaningful degree of input. The Court did not wish to impose
elaborate procedural requirements that would undermine schools'
capacity to administer discipline; it simply determined that students
facing temporary suspension "be given some kind of notice and afforded
some kind of hearing."73 In that "hearing," a student would simply be
entitled to "an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story."74
Similarly, a public employee who suffers the immediate detriment
of disciplinary action and the seeds of later harm from its record should
be notified of the reason for the action and given a chance to contest it.
70. In a sense, the elaborate procedural requirements of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 26468 (1970) (requiring prior to termination of welfare benefits that recipient have right to evidentiary
hearing that includes, inter alia, opportunity to state recipient's positions orally, to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to retain an attorney), represented a last gasp of the Warren
Court "revolution" in the area of due process. Since Goldberg, the Court has routinely refused to
insist on a panoply of trial-type procedures. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478, 480, 487
(1995); Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 85 n.2 (1978); Mathews, 424
U.S. at 343; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,484 (1972).
71. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
72. Id. at 579.
73. Id.
74. Id.at581.
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The Goss Court recognized that recorded charges of misconduct could
"seriously damage ...students' standing with their fellow pupils and
their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher
education and employment., 75 An employee branded with recorded
charges of misconduct confronts a comparable, and arguably more
severe and less speculative, threat to her future livelihood. Accordingly,
she too should be entitled to the degree of participation necessary to
prevent arbitrary stigmatizing action by her employer. In the ordinary
instance, confronting the employee with the alleged basis for the
discipline and allowing her to respond-in recorded written form if she
wishes-could suffice. Beyond that, the degree to which these
procedural safeguards need ever extend beyond the most "rudimentary
precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct" 76 would
depend on a number of elements described below.
B.

The Spectrum of Discipline

The proposition that disciplinary measures short of dismissal can
trigger procedural due process does not mean that all discipline is
fungible. A spectrum exists, from mere reprimand to termination.
Accordingly, given a particular charge of employee misconduct,
procedural protection should be commensurate with the severity of the
action taken in response to the alleged behavior.
The most difficult case may be the first and mildest point on the
spectrum: viz., a written reprimand unaccompanied by any sort of
tangible penalty. Ideally, an employee should have some constitutional
safeguard against a charge in her personnel file that could act as a "time77
bomb waiting to explode when sent to a prospective employer.",
Admittedly, however, no plausible construction of "stigma-plus" would
acknowledge a presumptive right to even a highly informal exchange
before a reprimand could be issued. Moreover, even though this Article
proposes a more expansive conception of due process under state
constitutions to transcend the narrow confines of Paul's "stigma-plus, 78

75. Id. at 575 (footnote omitted).
76. Jd.at581.
77. Clark v. Maurer, 824 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). This
image was invoked by the plaintiff employee in Clark, who had been dismissed, to challenge the
presence of damaging material in his personnel file. In holding that no cognizable harm could occur
until a prospective employer actually viewed the material, however, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
metaphor and its implication. See id. at 565-67.
78. See infra Part IV.
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state courts are likely to be too influenced by federal jurisprudence to
stray this far from the Court's threshold of required harm.
Much easier to justify is some process for employees threatened
with demotion on the basis of charges that they may wish to challenge.
As discussed earlier, relegation to a lesser position within an agency can
constitute significant harm to an employee, both to her current welfare
and to her prospects for employment outside the agency. 9 Where the
demotion is based on potentially rebuttable allegations against the
employee, she should first be informed of the allegations and given an
opportunity to respond. The grounds should be set forth with sufficient
specificity as to alert the employee of the behavior of which she is being
accused. Conversely, the employee should be afforded time and
opportunity to gather evidence to refute the charge. While no formal
hearing or even a live proceeding80 would be required, the employee
would be entitled to present her written response. This approach would
promote reasoned decision making by government managers, and the
contemporaneous record of the employee's version of events would
offer a fuller perspective to potential future employers.
Although generally not as devastating as demotion, suspension still
calls for some degree of procedural consideration. Whether a particular
suspension warrants more than the rudiments of notice and an
opportunity to respond prescribed in Goss should depend on a number of
factors: the length of the suspension, whether it is paid or unpaid, and, as
discussed below, the severity of the charge. In other words, the harsher
the impact of the suspension on both the employee's current standing in
the agency and her prospects there, the more closely her hearing should
resemble that accorded an employee threatened with demotion.
The most difficult situation, and the one calling for especially
individualized consideration, is allegation of improper behavior made in
the course of a formally lateral reassignment. Courts have tended to
pigeonhole such employer action as transfers wholly immune from due
process review.8 ' Yet, at least in some cases, this approach seems to
elevate simple classification over practical consequences. While it is
tempting to regard horizontal movement on an organizational chart as
neutral and nonpunitive, careful investigation may indicate a different
reality. Certainly, an official who "merely" transfers an employee to

79. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
80. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (refusing to require evidentiary
hearing prior to termination of Social Security disability benefits); supra note 70.
81. See supra note 42.
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another position in response to the employee's alleged misconduct
presumably views the reassignment as having negative implications.
In light of the ambiguous ramifications of transfers, an employee's
entitlement to due process should depend principally on two factors.
First, a court should evaluate whether the "transfer" label aptly describes
the shift in the employee's circumstance. Just as demotion or harsh
treatment can sometimes amount to constructive discharge,82 so the
conditions of an ostensible transfer might be so inferior to those of the
employee's prior position as to represent a functional demotion.
Additionally, the link in such cases between the allegedly false charge
and the adverse reassignment should be definite before procedural
requirements are imposed. Since the rationale for procedural protection
is that the record of the transfer in the employee's personnel file will
prejudice her future employment, it is crucial that the transfer would
reasonably be viewed in a critical light. If both of these conditions are
met, then the employee deserves process comparable to that described
above for employees who have suffered an unequivocal demotion.
C. The Depth of Stigma
A different sort of sliding scale involves the nature of the
accusation against the employee. The charge of misconduct provoking
the disciplinary action should be exceptionally serious before the
employee is entitled to procedural safeguards. To avoid excessive
interference with officials' managerial latitude, generalized evaluations
of incompetence or reports of relatively minor infractions should not be
regarded as infringing even more generous notions of liberty interests.
To a considerable extent, this approach incorporates existing
principles requiring a conspicuous degree of stigma for a terminated
employee to be deprived of a liberty interest. The allegedly false charge
must either involve criminal or highly offensive conduct,83 or otherwise
substantially diminish the employee's attractiveness to potential future
employers. 4 These same criteria could be applied to charges associated
82. See Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 238 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1189, (2000); Brittell v. Dep't of Corr., 717 A.2d 1254, 1270-71 (Conn. 1998); JAMES W. HUNT &
PATRICIA K. STRONGIN, THE LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: RIGHTS OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
137 (3d ed. 1994).
83. See Hughes v. City of Garland, 204 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 2000); Cabrol v. Town of
Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101, 107 (5th Cir. 1997); Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353, 1363 (6th Cir.
1993); Clark v. Maurer, 824 F.2d 565, 566 (7th Cir. 1987); Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 763 A.2d 209,
235 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 42 P.3d 233, 242 (Nev. 2002).
84. See Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 630-31 (2d Cir.
1996).
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with disciplinary actions besides dismissal, but applied more stringently.
For example, a heightened demonstration of the probable effect of the
charge, its falsity, and even the employer's scienter could be required.
Thus, whereas the Second Circuit has stated that stigmatizing comments
about terminated employees can reach matters beyond illegality,
dishonesty, or immorality 5 to encompass government pronouncements
of unfitness,86 a narrower conception could obtain where termination
does not occur. Only ascribed behavior that would manifestly thwart the
employee's ability to pursue comparable employment might qualify.
Similarly, while a discharged employee can presumably prevail by
meeting the ordinary preponderance standard, an employee otherwise
disciplined could be made to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence the charge's falsity and the employer's knowledge of it.87 Such
burdens would go far toward preventing a flood of unwarranted claims
by disgruntled employees. Combined with limitations on the scope of
the remedy available,88 these standards would discourage due process
challenges in nontermination cases except in instances of egregious
abuse of employer discipline.89
D.

FactualExplicitness

As suggested above, only charges that can be reasonably
understood as attributing verifiable misconduct to a nonterminated
public employee should receive procedural consideration. It should not
be enough that the agency has disciplined the employee "for

85. See Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 446 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980).
86. See O'Neill v. City of Auburn, 23 F.3d 685, 692 (2d Cir. 1994).
87. Cf Monaghan, supra note 18, at 433 (suggesting as limiting principle to Paul that "wholly
unjustified defamation of an individual with the purpose and effect of inflicting unjustifiable mental
suffering" still qualify as invasion of liberty interest under Due Process Clause). Experience with
the "actual malice" standard in defamation cases, N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964) (requiring plaintiff to whom standard applies to prove that defendant made allegedly
defamatory statement "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not"), shows that such a burden poses an exceedingly daunting barrier. See Marc A.
Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 795, 801, 829
(1981); Marc A. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455, 471,489, 498 (1980).
88. See infra Part III.E.
89. In theory, an employer might circumvent even the limited protection proposed here by
issuing a series of relatively light defamatory charges, the cumulative effect of which would be to
darken the employee's file. It seems advisable, though, to confront such conduct on a case-by-case
basis if it materializes rather than to design a standard in anticipation of this degree of malicious
cynicism.
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incompetence or because she can no longer do the job."90 Rather, only
allegations of specific behavior susceptible to resolution by an objective
factfinder should implicate the liberty interest of a disciplined employee.
Under this standard, critical personnel evaluations that could be
plausibly viewed as insinuating particular conduct would not qualify
unless the implication unmistakably amounted to a specific accusation in
all but form. In a sense, the Milkovich Court's receptiveness to finding
defamation by connotation" would be modified in this context in order
to contain the volume of employee complaints. Following Milkovich's
rejection of a92 blanket constitutional privilege for statements classified as
"'opinion,'
a number of courts have displayed a willingness to detect
defamatory factual assertions lurking in apparent statements of
viewpoint. 93 A readiness to interpret employers' critical assessments of
employees' performance as defamatory charges, however, would chill
candid evaluation and hamper managerial discretion.
The gatekeeping function of this approach is reinforced by the
courts' role in determining the range of reasonable constructions of
allegedly defamatory statements. Even under the relatively permissive
Milkovich regime, courts have continued to dismiss a substantial
proportion of defamation suits on summary judgment on the grounds
that the defendant's expression cannot fairly be read to contain provably
false assertions against the plaintiff.94 Exercised even more rigorously
here, this judicial responsibility would shield government employers
from the specter of jury second-guessing of good-faith evaluations and
discipline. By the same token, awareness of the high threshold of
explicitness will deter employees from lightly contending that an
employer has committed an actionable slur.
E. Limitations on Remedy
The formidable prerequisites to procedural relief already proposed
would probably deflect any potential clamor by large numbers of
90. Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 630 (2d Cir. 1996)
(finding liberty interest implicated where public employee has been dismissed on such basis).
91. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
92. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990). The Court approvingly cited the
approach of the Restatement. See id. at 19 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a
(1977)). That approach broadly authorizes liability for a statement in the form of an opinion "if it
implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." RESTATEMENT,
supra, § 566.
93. See Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter of Opinion: Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 499-505 (1994).
94. See id. at 506-35, 540-50.
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disciplined public employees for entitlement to due process. As ultimate
assurance against promoting a plethora of claims, however, the remedy
available in the infrequent instance where relief is warranted should also
be tightly restricted. Specifically, the employee should be given the
opportunity that she should have received in the first place to rebut the
charge. If the hearing demonstrates the falsity of the charge, then the
charge should be expunged from her file. The employer would not be
subject to personal damages.
Under this system, employees (and their lawyers) would not be
tempted to demand relief by prospects of a lucrative award. Instead, the
remedy would be designed to attract only those seeking vindication of
their good name in the face of what they believe to be false and
damaging allegations. At the same time, since the employee remains
within the agency, the remedy would provide worthy plaintiffs what they
presumably need above all-removal of a stain on their record before its
harm can spread.95
Of course, the redress of simple vindication may be considerably
less appealing than damages to many employees. However, it can be
seen as commensurate with the liberty interest affected. While at least
one circuit court of appeals has entertained the possibility of damages
when the grounds for termination of a public employee are shown to be
false,96 they would generally be disproportionate to the harm caused a
disciplined employee. It is not unalterably enshrined in our
jurisprudence that damages are the exclusive satisfactory remedy for
injury to reputation.97 Moreover, in the case of the most outrageous
employer abuses, state law could be expected to make available the
possibility of damages notwithstanding the normal employer's
privilege.98 Directing employees to pursue a state cause of action in such

95. It has been argued that in the case of the government's falsely branding an individual,
"monetary damages can never adequately compensate an individual for the loss of his ability to
engage in the normal activities of daily life. Thus, the only effective means of protecting a person
against such egregious state action is to prevent it." Thomas J. Stalzer, Note, Reputation as a
Constitutionally ProtectibleInterest, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 290, 305 (1976).
96. See Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 1996);
see also Morris v. City of Danville, 579 F. Supp. 900, 910 (W.D. Va. 1984), vacated by 744 F.2d
1041 (4th Cir. 1984) (employee denied due process entitled to de novo hearing before impartial
decision maker with power to reinstate employee with full backpay).
97. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (suggesting possibility of retraction statutes authorizing plaintiffs ability to prove
defamatory falsehoods to require publication of a retraction).
98. See Minnis v. McDonnell Douglas Tech. Servs. Co., 162 F. Supp. 2d 718, 740 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (discussing standard for overcoming qualified employer privilege).
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instances furthers Paul's purpose of avoiding redundancy between
federal and state remedial schemes. 99
Finally, as a practical matter, the potential availability of some kind
of hearing and ultimately a correction strikes a reasonable balance of
incentives and deterrents for employers who feel moved to record
pejorative grounds for discipline. Without the fear of personal liability,
an employer will have less need to resist revisiting a charge of employee
misconduct that may not have been well-founded. On the other hand, the
discomfort of even an informal hearing and the possibility of retraction
will give pause to employers before memorializing damaging statements
about their employees.
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE INDISPENSABLE ROLE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS

As already indicated, it is extremely unlikely that courts would
embrace the right of public employees proposed here as implementing
the central principles of Paul and its progeny. Rather, this more
expansive conception of due process must come from a different source:
viz., state constitutions. By interpreting their own constitutions as
affording some procedural protection to nonterminated public
employees, state supreme courts can fill this gap in federal doctrine.
The idea that state courts need not slavishly confine the
interpretation of state constitutional rights to those conferred by their
federal counterpart provisions is neither new nor radical. Perhaps most
famously, a quarter-century ago Justice Brennan, in the face of the
Burger Court's retreat from the Warren Court revolution, urged litigants
to invoke state constitutions in asserting violations of their liberty.' °°
Whether or not influenced by Brennan and other commentators,'' state
courts on numerous occasions since then have ascertained the existence
of rights under their own jurisprudence
that the Supreme Court had
02
declined to find in the Constitution.
The promulgation of state due process rights for disciplined public
employees who assert that they have been falsely accused would not
99. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
100. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
101. See, e.g., Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become
Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1065 (1997).
102. See, e.g., People v. Antkoviak, 619 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375,
1378-79 (N.H. 1993).
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impose a significant strain on interpretive methodology. State
constitutions have their own express due process clauses;0 3 extending
the right already enjoyed by dismissed employees under the federal
regime would hardly represent a drastic leap. Besides, in the unlikely
event that recognition of this right were to arouse broad outrage, state
constitutional amendment is generally much easier to accomplish
than
°
the cumbersome process prescribed by the Constitution."
Of course, recognition by state courts of a state-based right to due
process by these employees would provide no succor to members of
federal agencies. Furthermore, the recognition of this right by some, but
not all, state courts would aggravate the patchwork nature of available
relief to public employees. However, experience with the existence of
the right in even a few jurisdictions might counter fears of disruption of
government efficiency if disciplined employees are sometimes entitled
to challenge charges against them. This success might spur other states,
through judicial interpretation or legislation, to grant this right; even the
federal government might ultimately follow suit. In this way, states will
have served their function in the federal system as laboratories for
experimentation.' 5 Finally, even if contrary to the premise of this
Article, the scheme proved unworkable, the experiment will still have
performed this function.

103. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19.
104. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring approval by three-quarters of states after proposal by
two-thirds of both houses of Congress or convention called by two-thirds of states); Richard B.
Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures That Do and Don't Work, 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 107 (1995); David R. Keyser, State Constitutions and Theories of Judicial
Review: Some Variations on a Theme, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1073 (1985).

105. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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